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Eritrea: The Road to Decolonization and Geopolitical Challenges

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by Weldu Ghebreselasie

Eritrea’s quest for independencetraversed tortuous and difficult terrain and diplomatic and geopolitical betrayal, resulting in a 30-year armed struggle. Cold war geopolitical dynamics trampled on Eritrea’s inherent right to decolonization that was granted to many African colonies without having had to experience the painful journey Eritrea had gone through to prove its distinct identity.

The Road to Decolonization

Eritrea was officially established as an Italian colony (1890–1941) in 1890, holding a distinct geographical entity. However, it should be remembered that the history of the Eritrean people did not begin with the advent of Italian colonization. The people of Eritrea had their own history and civilization, as well as their own laws and administrative systems, long before European colonialism. Ottoman rule (1557–1865), which controlled parts of the Red Sea coast and extended influence into sections of the lowlands, was followed by Egyptian rule (1872–1882), which also governed the Eritrean coastal and western lowlands.

While the Italians developed urban centers, railways, and ports, designed for a “settler colony” benefiting Italian colonists, who by 1939 made up about 10% of the population, the colonial period was one of land confiscation and exploitation, racial discrimination, and military usage (Ascari), which triggered persistent resistance and opposition to colonial rule, resulting in the imprisonment or execution of traditional leaders.

Following the defeat of Italy in World War II, Eritrea’s fate fell into the hands of the British Military Administration (1941–1952), which viewed the territory as a spoils-of-war area to be exploited. In a sinister scheme to undermine its status as viable entity, the British dismantled the infrastructure developed under Italy and sold or transported significant portions of Eritrea’s industrial and transportation infrastructure to other British colonies and territories, depriving Eritrean of its industrial base. By advancing the presumptuous notion that Eritreans lacked the capacity for unity and self-governance, British officials betrayed the trust and aspirations of the Eritrean people, pursuing a policy aimed at dismembering Eritrea by dividing its territory and population along religious lines and apportioning part of its territory to neighboring countries.

While the British Military Administration (BMA) period was significant for the emergence of Eritrea’s first competing political movements, it also deepened internal divisions. The BMA sought to partition Eritrea by incorporating the western region into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the eastern region into Ethiopia, arguing that the population was not yet prepared for self-determination. This policy was driven by several motives: maintaining control over strategic ports such as Massawa, appeasing Emperor Haile Selassie, a key Allied partner during World War II who desired access to the sea, and persuading the United Nations that Eritrea was economically unviable as an independent state. Moreover, by supporting, or at times overlooking, the violence committed by pro-unionist groups, including shifta bandits, against independence supporters, the BMA contributed to instability in order to reinforce the claim that Eritrea was incapable of governing itself.

Following the end of the British Military Administration (1941–1952), the “Eritrean case” was referred to the United Nations (UN) in 1948 by the Allied Four Powers after they failed to reach an agreement. In 1950, the United Nations adopted Resolution 390(V), recommending that Eritrea become an autonomous unit federated with Imperial Ethiopia, a staunch Cold War ally under Emperor Haile Selassie. The federation was formally finalized on September 15, 1952.

Key Reasons for the Federation Include

  • Cold War Strategic Interests: The United States viewed the Red Sea region as strategically vital during the Cold War and sought to secure continued access to military and communications facilities, particularly Kagnew Station in Asmara. Backing Ethiopia’s claim over Eritrea helped Washington maintain a dependable regional ally and safeguard its geopolitical interests.
  • Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access: Ethiopia strongly advocated for federation with Eritrea in order to obtain direct access to the Red Sea. Control of Eritrean ports was considered essential for trade, security, and reducing dependence on external transit routes and foreign-controlled ports such as those in Djibouti.
  • Containment of Instability and Communism: U.S. policymakers feared that a small, newly independent Eritrea might become politically unstable and vulnerable to Soviet or broader communist influence. Federation with Imperial Ethiopia was therefore seen as a means of ensuring regional stability and limiting Cold War rivalries in the Horn of Africa.
  • The Federal Arrangement — UN Resolution 390 A (V): Under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 390 A (V), Eritrea was established as an autonomous federal unit under the Ethiopian Crown. Although the arrangement formally guaranteed Eritrea internal self-government, its autonomy was progressively undermined and ultimately abolished by Ethiopia in 1962, in violations of the Federal Act, which explicitly stipulated that Eritrea “shall constitute an autonomous unit” federated with Ethiopia under the Crown. This annexation and the United Nations’s dereliction of responsibility to address the violation became the immediate catalyst for Eritrea’s thirty-year liberation struggle.

The federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 was a United Nations-brokered arrangement that was largely imposed against the wishes of many Eritreans, who sought full independence after their period as an Italian colony. The federation served the geopolitical interests of the United States and the expansionist goals of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.

The 30-Year War of Liberation (1961–1991) and Challenges

Born of great power’s strategic calculations in the Horn and stark denial of the inherent right to decolonization, the Eritrean quest for independence marked the transition from political resistance to armed one on September 1, 1961, with Hamid Idris Awate and his band firing the first shots. Contrary to the deliberate distortions, the Eritrean armed struggle conducted the long, arduous resistance without significant external assistance. Rather, its struggle was rooted in self-reliance philosophy, captured weapons, and internal production, asserting that depending on external help would compromise its independent path. Worth mentioning, however, is the worthwhile dedication of the Eritrean diaspora in organizing, mobilizing, sacrificing, and sustaining the armed struggle with their labor, their earnings, their advocacy, and their unwavering faith in Eritrea’s freedom from the early 1970s up to the independence of Eritrea in 1991.

The Eritrean armed struggle endured immense challenges that prolonged the conflict into a thirty-year war for independence. Despite limited international support and Ethiopia’s overwhelming manpower advantage, the struggle persisted in dismantling the imposed Ethiopian colonial structure that sought to suppress Eritrea’s legitimate claim to sovereignty. The people of Eritrea fought against a heavily armed Ethiopian military backed by Cold War superpowers—the United States during the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, and later the Soviet Union under the rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam, resulting in immense sacrifices, including over 60,000 casualties, widespread civilian displacement and deaths, and severe economic devastation.

Post-Independence Challenges

  • 1998-2000 border with Ethiopia

As if it was not enough, politically-motivated external challenges followed on the heels of independent Eritrea.  Seven years into its independence, Eritrea was forced into externally-triggered border dispute over the flashpoint Badme in 1998-200 war with Ethiopia. Following the1998 -2000 border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) delivered its final and binding ruling on the border dispute on April 13, 2002, at the Hague, following the Algiers Agreement. In flagrant breach of the agreement, the Ethiopian regime, justifying its refusal through byways and orchestrating regime change, failed to comply with the final and binding ruling. The Ethiopian regime’s backsliding on the border settlement, compounded by external pressure, created a “no war, no peace” situation that in turn had a deleterious effect on Eritrea’s development efforts.

The government under Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in 2018, belatedly agreed to abide by the ruling and usher in a new era of peace and coexistence with Eritrea, only to revert to irredentist posture– pursuing its “sovereign access to the sea” agenda–in stark breach of the foundational principles of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruling, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the UN Charter.

  • UN Sanctions (2009–2018) for alleged support for All-Shabab and Border Dispute with Djibouti

The sanctions included arms embargoes, travel bans, and asset freezes on officials. The July 7, 2009 WikiLeaks later titled UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY revealed:

Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs Seyoum Mesfin and State Minister Dr. Tekeda Alemu on July 7 called in the Ambassadors of the P-5 countries to urge them to convey to their respective capitals the need to support the July African Union (AU) resolution calling on the UNSC to levy sanctions on Eritrea for its destabilizing activities in Somalia.

The unwarranted sanctions strengthened in 2011 and ultimately lifted in 2018. The UN Security Council lifted sanctions, acknowledging that the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea had not found conclusive evidence of support for Al-Shabaab.

  • Dispute with Djibouti

Essentially, the putative conflict with Djibouti was engineered by external powers to isolate Eritrea diplomatically. In May 2008, Eritrea stated that there was no such problem with Djibouti.

  • Unilateral U.S. Sanctions (2021–2026)

Imposed by the Biden administration over the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, these targeted the Eritrean Defense Force (EDF), causing financial and logistical bottlenecks for the country. Eritrea was drawn into the Tigray war to defend itself, consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of self-defense.

  • Illegal Targeting of the Diaspora

Sanctions have targeted the 2% rehabilitation tax (recovery tax) voluntarily contributed by the diaspora, intending to distort the Rehabilitation and Recovery tax enacted in 1994 to involve the diaspora’s participation in the development of the country.

  • Geopolitical Disagreements with Western Powers

  Eritrea’s self-reliance philosophy and independent path brought Eritrea into conflict with external powers, resulting in tense relations with several international entities. The national stance which detractors pejoratively mischaracterize as ‘isolationism’’ is rooted in achieving national independence and sovereignty, as well as strengthening diplomatic relationship. The Eritrean National Charter clearly states that, at the core of Eritrea’s diplomatic policy, are regional and international cooperation; harmonious coexistence and cooperation with its neighbors; and contributions to regional and global peace, security, and development.

Moreover, contrary to the Potemkin Party’s flawed framing of Eritrean sovereignty claims as a concealment of insecurity and a political instrument to destabilize Ethiopia, Eritrea’s reassertion of its sovereignty should be viewed in the context of Ethiopian regimes’ illegal claims to Eritrean maritime territory, in blatant violation of international law and the principles of sovereignty.

In a nutshell, since its inception as Italian colonial entity in 1890 through the political and armed struggle and over the course of its independence period, Eritrea has been navigating a rough geopolitical landscape, demonization, interference and sanctions. While the multi-pronged historical adversity has had economic and political effects, it further strengthened Eritrean nationhood and its unwavering independent economic and political trajectory, untainted by dependence and the tendency to bow to debilitating external aid. As Eritrea’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sofia Tesfamariam, in her response to recent Ethiopian commentary on Eritrean sovereignty claims, aptly noted: “Eritrea’s foreign policy has consistently emphasized sovereign equality, non-interference, regional ownership, and resistance to hegemonic arrangements in the Horn of Africa.”

References

  • BBC News. (2008, May 10). Eritrea denies Djibouti war claim. BBC News article.
  • Bushra, A. (2025, June 1). Unfulfilled promises: Europe’s joy and the betrayal of Eritrea in the wake of fascist defeat in World War II. Modern Diplomacy. Modern Diplomacy article.
  • Connell, D. (1993). Against all odds: A chronicle of the Eritrean revolution. Red Sea Press.
  • Eritrea. (1952). The Eritrean Constitution (as ratified, September 11, 1952).
  • Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission. (2002). Final award.
  • Frezghi, A. (2026, May 4). The Eritrean diaspora. Red Sea Beacon. Red Sea Beacon article
  • Holcomb, B. K., & Ibssa, S. (1990). The invention of Ethiopia: The making of a dependent colonial state in northeast Africa. Red Sea Press.
  • Iyob, R. (1995). The Eritrean struggle for independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism. Cambridge University Press.
  • People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. (1994). PFDJ national charter: Adopted by the 3rd Congress of the EPLF/PFDJ, Naqfa, February 10–16, 1994. https://snitna.com/PFDJCharter_Eng.pdf
  • Reid, R. (2019). A modern history of Eritrea. James Currey.
  • Shabait. (2025, December 5). Opinion and analysis: Imperative of paradigm shift for enduring regional peace and stability. Shabait article.
  • United Nations. (1950). General Assembly Resolution 390(V).
  • United Nations Security Council. (2009–2018). Resolutions on Eritrea.
  • U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa. (2009). Ethiopia urges UNSC approval of African Union call for sanctions against Eritrea (Cable No. 09ADDISABABA1589_a). WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks cable