Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party Theatrics to Disguise Aggression as ‘Self-Defense’: Too Little, Too Late!

Three years after publicly declaring its policy of aggression against Eritrea and other countries in the Horn of Africa under the banner of “securing sovereign access to the sea, by any means necessary,” the Ethiopian Government seems to have belatedly realized that this illegal, anachronistic and destabilizing policy is internationally and legally indefensible. Abiy Ahmed and his ruling party have subsequently shifted gear to desperately revert to the manufacturing of a new pretext to mask the expansionist agenda under the spurious mantle of “self-defense”.

The self-defense pretext was thus invoked, without any supporting evidence, in the letter of the Ethiopian Government to the UN Security Council, on 9 October last month, literally “notifying” the latter of Ethiopia’s declaration of war against Eritrea.

This ominous and unlawful measure came exactly three years after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly unveiled, on 13 October 2023, his strategy to secure “sovereign access to the sea by any means necessary – through negotiations if possible and by force if necessary”. Senior political and military leaders of the Ethiopian Government have since repeated this policy ad nauseam.

Beyond rhetoric, the Ethiopian Government has been spending billions of borrowed US dollars on its weapons shopping spree, and training hundreds of thousands of soldiers to serve as cannon fodders in its numerous misadventures; even while the Ethiopian people are suffering from extreme poverty.

The Ethiopian Government’s policy of expansionism which continues to fuel conflict and destabilization across the Horn of Africa is formally documented in the “The Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.” This Strategy was launched with significant media fanfare on 29 February 2024, by the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. The full document was not disseminated publicly due to its subversive contents and related apprehension of potential and inevitable backlash.

We will now revert to dissect the historical narratives, legal analysis and policy options spelled out in the Strategy aimed at “securing sovereign access to the sea, by any means necessary”.

  • The Strategy Paper contradicts itself by admitting that no legal right exists for what it aspires for; and yet it avidly explores other unlawful options and avenues. Indeed, after exploring the provisions of international law on access to the sea, it concedes that it was wrong to argue for Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign access to the sea based on international law, as there is no international law granting these rights. The document subsequently alludes to tenuous precedents by arguing that some countries who secured access to the sea by other means have used various arguments to legitimize their conquest. (Page 65).
  • The Strategy Paper openly proposes tearing up binding international border treaties: In invoking the use of legal arguments to justify conquest, the Strategy Paper proposes that Ethiopia challenge and invalidate the Colonial Treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908 that delimited the boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This unlawful position would imply retroactive repudiation and annulment of the Algiers Agreement; rejection of the EEBC Arbitral Award and flagrant violations of international law, the UN Charter, the AU Constitutive Act and Africa’s inviolable position on the sanctity of inherited colonial boundaries. (Page 66).
  • The Strategy attempts to weaponize humanitarian principles to excuse raw aggression: The Strategy further explored applying equity, humanity and right to development as a non-political military alternative. The document concludes its exploration of historical precedents of using the aforementioned principles to secure sovereign access to sea, by openly admitting that there is indeed no legal provision that grants sovereign access to the sea to landlocked countries. Rather these principles can be used to defend acquisition of sea access by other means, i.e. aggression. (Page 67-69).
  • The Strategy relies on revisionist historical myths that erase neighboring sovereign nations: The Strategy’s historical justification for Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea not only misinterprets facts to push a narrative, but is completely dismissive of the existence, rights and aspirations of the Eritrean, Djiboutian and Somali people. (Page 80-117). However, even such self-serving narratives concede that it was only after the 1952 federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, that Ethiopia secured direct access to the sea after several centuries. Surely, several centuries earlier, there were no coherent political entities congruous with present-day State configuration in the region, but various kingdoms and chiefdoms with shifting centers and modicum of control in these areas.
  • The Strategy peddles fallacious revisionist history to claim that, Eritrean, Djiboutian and Somali ports historically belonged to Ethiopia, including Adulis, Zeila, Tadjoura and Berbera. (Page 124-126, 142). The Strategy, departing from this, advocates for Ethiopia to explore options to ensure reliable access through these ports and to focus on regaining ownership of these ports. (Page 143). The Strategy advises for caution to deter Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia from creating a common front for putting pressure on Ethiopia, and the need to prepare if the three countries ultimately stand against Ethiopia perceiving its quest for access to sea as a common threat. (Page 143).
  • The Strategy seeks to justify expansionism by framing it as a “matter of national survival”: In an effort to rationalize the Prosperity Party’s expansionist agenda, the Strategy portrays the survival of Ethiopia as a nation, and the prospects and trajectory of its economic development, as dependent on securing sovereign access to the sea. (Page 129). The untenable argument callously ignores the devastating human and material costs that would ensue from unnecessary and avoidable wars if the Ethiopian regime pursues this delusional policy of expansionism and regional destabilization.
  • The Strategy mandates building a massive military force to enforce its maritime ambitions: As a means of implementing this Strategy, the document underscores the importance of creating a strong defense force. It mentions the possibility of creating a Navy stationed on the high seas. (Page 135-136)
  • The Strategy floats various coercive proposals to mask outright territorial conquest: It floats certain fanciful and unrealistic options to secure access to the sea, (Page 145-147).
  • The Strategy advises exploiting global geopolitical rivalries to advance its agenda: The Strategy stipulates that Ethiopia should push its agenda to secure sovereign access to the sea by tactically exploiting the emerging multipolar world, being friendly to all sides, and not allying with any side. (Page 149).
  • The Strategy explicitly advocates illegal acts of aggression under the cover of diplomatic maneuver: In conclusion, the Strategy advocates the use of irregular measures, i.e. aggression, to secure access to the sea if the latter objective cannot be achieved through some diplomatic tools or applicable precedents. It advises undertaking diplomatic, public relations and legal preparations to ensure that the irregular measures used do not create strong international opposition. It asserts that international law is elastic and that when Ethiopia increases its economic, political and diplomatic power; it can push for development of a legal perspective that aligns with its interest. It mentions how Kosovo became independent, Israel controlled Syrian Golan height for fifty years, and Russia annexed Crimea as useful precedents for emulation. (Page 149-150).

In a nutshell and when the diplomatic doubletalk or veil is removed, the Strategy is starkly exposed for what it is: a shameless blueprint for land-grabbing by leaders who know full well that their legal arguments are a total sham.

While the Prime Minister and his political and military officials continue to incessantly talk about Ethiopia’s right to ‘sovereign access to the sea’, they are fully aware that there is no legal basis for it. Moreover, as Prime Minister Abiy admitted in his speech of 13 October 2023, Ethiopia’s neighboring countries have made it abundantly clear that there are no barriers for Ethiopia’s commercial access to the sea through bilateral negotiations, but their sovereignty is not negotiable under any conditions.

This is the backdrop behind the Ethiopian Government’s current invocation of “self-defense” to camouflage and repackage its long-planned war of aggression against Eritrea. But for the same, nefarious, reasons that inhibited the Government from publicly disseminating its Grand Strategy on the two waters, the actual policy blueprints on its war of aggression on Eritrea remain discreet too.  Be that as it may, the publicly declared policy of “securing sovereign access to the sea by any means necessary”, the convoluted historical narrative peddled to justify it; and, the illegal and anachronistic options contained in the document remain indefensible. They constitute flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the AU Constitutive Act as well as cardinal principles of international law. The Government’s policy of aggression is a criminal offense even under Ethiopian law. (Art 261 and 263 of the Criminal Code of FDRE).

The Government of Ethiopia may have felt relieved in its ability to hide (until today) the content of the Grand Strategy from the public, but its effort to give legitimacy to its policy of aggression by concocting a flimsy case of ‘self-defense’ is too little and too late to be taken seriously.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea

Research and Documentation Division

19 November 2026